Operate · Cloud security

Cloud risk, traced to the code and team that own it.

Heeler checks AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud and Kubernetes against the frameworks you report on, confirms what the internet can actually reach, and shows which vulnerable code is running there. Every finding goes to the team that can fix it, in near real time.

Inventory

Every account and resource, in one inventory.

Connect an AWS Organization, Google Cloud organization, Azure tenant or Oracle Cloud tenancy once. Heeler finds every account, cluster and about 250 resource types.

cloudAWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud and Kubernetes
account_treeOne StackSet for an AWS Organization, no stored keys on Google Cloud
syncUpdated in near real time from cloud change events
Cloud inventory5 connections
ConnectionProviderScopeAccountsResourcesEvents
acme-awsAWSOrganization4218,406Live
acme-gcpGoogle CloudOrganization124,210Live
acme-azureAzureTenant62,388Live
acme-ociOracle CloudTenancy3912Live
eks-prod-usKubernetesEKS11,644Live
acme-aws · changes in the last 10 minutes+ ingress rulesg-orders · 0.0.0.0/0 on 5432+ bucket policyacme-exports · principal outside the organization
Exposure

See what the internet and outside accounts can reach.

Heeler follows the network path to each resource and tests the connection. It reads resource and trust policies to find public, cross-account and vendor access.

publicInternet accessible on 26 resource types, confirmed by a live test
sharePublic, cross-account and vendor access in AWS resource policies
admin_panel_settingsIAM roles that can escalate to admin, and identities no one uses
orders-dbRDS · prod-payments
databasePostgreSQLlocation_onus-east-1badgeHandles PII
OverviewExposureChecksDeploymentsExposed 2
publicInternet0.0.0.0/0
routerigw-prod · route table rt-publicpublic subnet
lan
Security group sg-orders allows 5432 from anywhereInbound rule on a database port
Critical
databaseorders-db · publicly accessibleendpoint
cable
Live connection test: port 5432 answeredReachable from the internet, not just configured
Confirmed
share
S3 bucket readable by an account outside your organizationResource policy · cross-account read
High
4Hops from the internet
2Exposures
Team PaymentsOwner
Cloud Events

See who changed what in your cloud, and catch the suspicious changes.

Heeler reads every write in AWS CloudTrail, Google Cloud audit logs and the Azure Activity Log in near real time. Dozens of Heeler-managed rules, mapped to CIS benchmarks and known attack techniques, flag the changes that need a look.

ruleHeeler-managed rules plus your own, each tested against the last 7 days before it goes live
location_onWho made the change, from which country, and what else they did in the 10 minutes around it
forumSuspicious events start workflows in Slack, Teams, Jira, Linear, email or a webhook
Suspicious cloud eventsLast 24 hours
cloudAWScloudGoogle CloudcloudAzure
cancel
Audit logging disabled or removedStopLogging · acme-aws · ci-deployer
Critical
share
Snapshot shared with an unknown accountModifySnapshotAttribute · prod-payments · from a country not seen before
High
lan
Firewall opened to the internetcompute.firewalls.insert · acme-gcp · port 22 from 0.0.0.0/0
High
admin_panel_settings
Privileged role assigned broadlyOwner at subscription scope · acme-azure
High
12,480Writes today
4Suspicious
1New country
Code to cloud

Know which vulnerabilities are running, and where.

Heeler matches each deployment to the image, commit and repository it came from. Each code and dependency finding shows whether it ships in a running service, whether that service is exposed, and what data it can reach.

commitECS, Lambda, EC2, Azure VMs and Kubernetes matched to source commits
deployed_codeImages linked to their repository through build provenance and labels
priority_highExposure and data access raise Heeler Risk on code, dependency, IaC and image findings
payments-apiService
cloudprod-us · ECS · 3 taskscommita41c9e2folderacme/payments-api
OverviewDeploymentsVulnerabilitiesInfrastructureEndpointsRunning 2
deployed_code
log4j-core 2.14.1 · CVE-2021-45046In the running image · internet accessible · reaches orders-db
Urgent
deployed_code
jackson-databind 2.9.10 · CVE-2020-36518In the running image · internet accessible
Urgent
folderspring-web 5.3.18 · CVE-2016-1000027repository only
commitDeployed a41c9e2 to prod-us2 hours ago
3 of 3Tasks on a41c9e2
2Running vulnerabilities
Team PaymentsOwner
Posture and compliance

Check every resource against the frameworks you report on.

456 checks for AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud, mapped to AWS Foundational Security Best Practices and CIS benchmarks. Scores by framework and account, re-checked in near real time.

ruleAWS FSBP, CIS AWS 3.0 to 7.0, CIS Google Cloud 4.0, CIS Oracle Cloud 3.1.1
tuneYour own frameworks, with versions and crosswalks
verified_userExemptions need a second approver and an end date
Frameworks · acme · all accounts38 failing checks
63% AWS FSBP
CIS AWS 7.0 · 43%
CIS Google Cloud 4.0 · 71%
CIS Oracle Cloud 3.1.1 · 51%
Payments framework v3 · 78%
CriticalDatabase port open to the internet · EC2.19sg-orders · remove the 0.0.0.0/0 rule on 5432
CriticalRoot account without hardware MFA · IAM.6
HighCloud Storage bucket allows public read · Google Cloud
verified_userExemption EXM-0042 · approved by a second adminEnds 31 Mar
Ownership

Trace a failing check to the service, code and team behind it.

Pick any failing resource. Heeler shows the service that uses it, the infrastructure code that defines it, and the team that owns the account, with the steps to fix it.

rule
Failing checkEC2.19AWS FSBP · Critical
lan
Resourcesg-ordersprod-payments · us-east-1
database
Datastoreorders-dbRDS · handles PII
cloud
Servicepayments-apiprod-us · internet accessible
data_object
Infrastructure codeacme/infrards.tf defines orders-db
groups
OwnerTeam Paymentsowns the payments-prod OU
Incident responseWhat can the internet reach?orders-db on 5432confirmed by a live connection test
AuditWhich control fails?AWS FSBP EC2.19evidence for DORA and your own frameworks
Fix routingWho fixes it?Team Paymentssteps to fix, with CLI commands and references

How it connects

ConnectGrant read-only accessA CloudFormation StackSet for an AWS Organization. Workload Identity Federation for Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud, with no stored keys. An app registration for Azure.
CollectInventory and change eventsHeeler harvests every account and follows CloudTrail, Google Cloud audit logs and Azure Activity Log in near real time.
ReviewResults appear in HeelerCloud posture, inventory and failing checks, scoped to the accounts each team owns.
Before it reaches the cloud

Check infrastructure code and images before they deploy.

Block risky infrastructure changes on the pull request.

Terraform, OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Pulumi and Kubernetes manifests. Findings are matched to the live resources they define.

Explore Infrastructure as code

Scan the images your cloud runs.

Images are scanned when they are pushed to ECR or Artifact Registry. Heeler finds which ones run in ECS, Kubernetes, Cloud Run and Lambda.

Explore Container images

Report cloud posture from your coding agent.

The Heeler MCP server returns posture by framework and account, exposure and failing checks to any MCP client.

Explore MCP Server

Purpose-built for the AI SDLC

Know what runs in your cloud, what can reach it, and who fixes it.