ENTRY POINT
New listener
Review the external boundary and authentication requirement.
AUTOMATED THREAT MODELING · THREAT-INFORMED AI DEVELOPMENT
Map changed files to model elements and deliver their security requirements through MCP, the CLI and hooks. Detect selected architecture changes and let agents propose model updates for human review.
Heeler maps file paths to model elements. MCP, the CLI and pre-edit hooks deliver the relevant requirements before the agent edits; post-edit hooks check selected architecture changes.
Illustrative file mapping and hook result. Model and application permissions govern access.
CLI
heeler threat-model context --files src/events/retention.ts
Organization-specific skills tell the agent when to retrieve requirements, how to apply your security guidance and when to propose a model change. Developers can access the workflow through their coding agent, the CLI and VS Code.
Model and application permissions govern access. Installing a skill does not grant the agent access to additional systems.
Post-edit hooks check the diff for selected signals and offer a model-change review when the addition is not represented.
ENTRY POINT
Review the external boundary and authentication requirement.
INTEGRATION
Review the external system and the data crossing the boundary.
DATA AND CREDENTIALS
Review the additional data handling and credential access.
The agent can submit its diff and proposed components and flows through MCP. Reviewers inspect the change set, apply the changes they accept and approve the resulting version. Existing review locks and partial-apply rules govern agent proposals.
The agent adds a receiver and a Redis cache. It proposes the new components and flows; the reviewer checks their trust boundaries and requirements before applying them.
CONNECTED TO THE HEELER PLATFORM
Threat-model requirements enter through MCP and Agent Skills. Heeler’s broader controls assess agent activity, code changes and pull requests at their respective stages. Model-impact comments and requirement checklists give reviewers the design context.
Threat-model guidance complements the platform’s configured controls, from the agent session to the pull request.
Heeler cross-checks CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules and skills against model requirements. Conflicting instructions surface as findings alongside the requirements they undermine.
Illustrative workflow.
Explore Coding Agent SecurityNo. It submits a review proposal; people retain the model’s apply and approval decisions.
No. It checks specific architecture signals in a diff. Supported scans and code/deployment verification provide deeper evidence.
The hook uses the existing Block-fails-open behavior. An unavailable check does not establish that the change complies with the model.
No. Model and application permissions still govern MCP and CLI access.
The webhook PR explains how it addresses authentication. Implementation verification checks the evidence at the analyzed revision and in the deployed environment.
AUTOMATED THREAT MODELING · FROM PROMPT TO RUNTIME